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Mencius famously remarked:
No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others : : : Suppose a man
were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He
would certainly be moved to compassion.1
What Mencius’s translator calls compassion is an instance of what I
shall call sympathetic concern or sympathy. It is a feeling or emotion
that (a) responds to some apparent threat or obstacle to an individual’s
good or well-being, (b) has that individual himself as object, and (c)
involves concern for him, and thus for his well-being, for his sake.
Seeing the child on the verge of falling, one is concerned for his
safety, not just for its (his safety’s) sake, but for his sake. One is
concerned for him. Sympathy for the child is a way of caring for
(and about) him.
Sympathy differs in this respect from several distinct psycholog-
ical phenomena usually collected under the term ‘empathy’, which
need not involve such concern. Common to these are feelings that, as
one psychologist puts it, are “congruent with the other’s emotional
state or condition.”2 Here it is the other’s standpoint that is salient, in
this case, the child’s as he faces the prospect of falling down the well.
Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps
should feel (fear, say), or in some imagined copy of these feelings,
whether one comes thereby to be concerned for the child or not.
Empathy can be consistent with the indifference of pure observation
or even the cruelty of sadism. It all depends on why one is interested
in the other’s perspective.3 Sympathy, on the other hand, is felt as
from the perspective of “one-caring.”4
We now know a good deal about the psychology of empathy
and sympathy. Much of this was gleaned by earlier observers like
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Hume and Adam Smith, who correctly believed these emotional
mechanisms to be central to human thought and practice. But a large
amount has come in this century, as experimental psychology has
developed and theoretical speculations about empathy and sympathy
have been submitted to experimental tests. Indeed, ‘empathy’ only
entered English when Edward Titchener coined it in 1909 to translate
Theordor Lipps’s ‘Einfühlung’, which he in turn had appropriated for
psychology from German aesthetics in 1905 and which derives from
a verb meaning “to feel one’s way into.”5 Both Hume and Smith had
used ‘sympathy’ to refer to the distinctive forms of empathy they
described.
In what follows, I wish to discuss empathy and sympathy’s rele-
vance to ethics, taking recent findings into account. In particular, I
want to consider sympathy’s relation to the idea of a person’s good
or well-being. It is obvious and uncontroversial that sympathetic
concern for a person involves some concern for her good and some
desire to promote it. What I want to suggest is that the concept of a
person’s good or well-being is one we have because we are capable
of care and sympathetic concern. Well-being is normative for care
in the sense that it is intrinsic to the very idea of a person’s good that
threats to it are what it makes sense to be concerned about for that
person for her sake.
Contrary to popular philosophical opinion, I believe that well-
being has no essential relevance to the first-person point of view
of a rational agent.6 It is neither conceptually nor metaphysically
necessary either (i) that what it makes sense for a person to desire
and seek will contribute to his well-being nor (ii) that whatever will
advance his good is something he should rationally seek, even prima
facie.7 Of course, we believe that any human being does have reason
to be concerned about his own good. But what stands behind that
belief? Why does it make sense for any person to be concerned about
his own good?
According to some views of well-being, (ii) is true because (i) is
true: all and only what a person has reason to desire counts as part of
his well-being. (Think here of informed desire-satisfaction theories
of well-being and rational choice.) The problem with these theories,
however, is that they make rational self-sacrifice not just normatively
inadvisable, but conceptually or metaphysically impossible. And
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they make rational egoism conceptually or metaphysically necessary
rather than a substantive, indeed controversial, normative claim.
But there are many things I rationally take an interest in, such as
the survival of the planet and the flourishing of my children long after
I am dead, that will make no contribution to my own well-being or
good. In a slogan, a person may have many rational interests (things
in which she takes a rational interest) that go well beyond what is
for her good or in her interest. Or, as we might also put it, a person’s
good – what benefits her or advances her well-being – is different
from what is good from her point of view or standpoint. The latter
is the perspective of what she herself cares about, whereas her own
good is what is desirable from the perspective of someone (perhaps
she herself) who cares about her.
I believe we have reason to care about our good because we have
reason to care about ourselves. A person’s good is what it makes
sense to want for that person’s sake, that is, insofar as one cares
about her. Desiring something for someone’s sake just is a form of
desire that springs from care. It is a desire that has, in addition to
a direct propositional object (that the person have some benefit),
an “indirect object” (the person herself).8 Concern for the person
supplies the indirect object.
If this is so, the primary locus of the concept of a person’s well-
being or good is not the first-person point of view, but the third-person
perspective of one-caring, a perspective we can take on ourselves
no less than on others. I have reason to care about others’ goods
insofar as I have reason to care about them, and I have reason to care
about my own good insofar as have reason to care about myself. And
while individuals may have more reason to care about themselves or
close relations than they do about strangers, I believe that neither is
possible without the capacity to care for self or others that is involved
in sympathetic concern.9
EMPATHY
To work toward some clarification and defense of these claims, we
should begin by distinguishing forms of empathy. Sympathy for a
person and her plight is felt as from the third-person perspective of
one-caring, whereas empathy involves something like a sharing of
the other’s mental states, frequently, as from her standpoint. This
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is different from caring about her, even imaginatively. After all,
the person we are empathizing with may hate herself, feel she is
worthless, and want nothing more than the misery she believes she
so richly deserves. Imaginatively sharing these concerns of hers (as
first-personally) is hardly the same thing as sympathy for her.10
Emotional Contagion
The most rudimentary form of empathy is “emotional contagion” or
“infection” as when one “catches” a feeling or emotional state from
another, not by imaginative projection, but more directly.11 Walking
into a room filled with laughter and convivial conversation, we feel
differently than when the room is filled with depression (or with
tension). This is a form of what Hume called “sympathy,” which
he defined as the “propensity we have : : : to receive by communica-
tion [the]inclinations and sentiments” of others,12 and when he said,
quoting Horace, that “the human countenance : : : borrows smiles or
tears from the human countenance.”13
Smiles and frowns (and, we might add, yawns and coughs) beget
their like, not because the person beholding the smiling face projects
herself into the smiling person’s standpoint and imagines what it
would be like to be seeing things in that smiling way, but directly,
without any mediating projective imaginative activity. Of course,
Humean sympathy must be harnessed to the imagination to play the
role Hume believes it does in moral judgment. Judging the merit
of a character trait or motive, Hume thinks, we are carried by an
association of ideas from thoughts of the trait or motive to thoughts
of its usual effects, including of the pleasure or pain it tends to
cause. But sympathy has done no work yet. Its job is to take us
from ideas of these pleasures or pains to pleasurable or painful
feelings and, thereby, to cause or constitute the moral sentiment that
moral judgments express. Hume supposes that this happens directly,
without any projection into the standpoint of those we imagine to be
pleased or pained.14
Hume believed that the way contagion functions in general is
through an “idea” of the communicated feeling. On his official
theory, “sympathy” takes ideas of passions or feelings as inputs
and transmits them into “the very passion[s]” themselves (T.317)
by infusing them more or less with our impression of ourselves, the
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degree being determined by how close the person whose feelings we
are contemplating is to us. According to Hume, therefore, we must
first be aware of feelings before sympathy can turn these into felt
impressions. But one doesn’t need an idea of a contagious emotion
to catch it. Being in the company of the anxious can create anxiety
even in those who are unaware of it in others.
How, then, does emotional contagion work? A central mechanism
seems to be mimicry. Facial mimicry, which we now know to be
present in neonates in their very first days, appears to be especially
important.15 But how can mimicry transfer feeling or emotion?
At least since Darwin (The Expression of the Emotions in Man
and Animals, 1872), it has been noted that emotions correlate with
specific bodily and facial movements.16 Emotions whose bodily
expressions are virtually universally recognized across cultures have
been shown to include anger, disgust, contempt, sadness, grief,
and happiness, among others.17 So far, this just shows that distinc-
tive feelings cause distinctive bodily expressions. Studies by Paul
Ekman and his colleagues, however, have shown that when subjects
are directed to assume facial positions that are characteristic of an
emotion without grasping the experimenter’s ulterior purpose, they
actually tend to experience the emotion themselves.18 Other exper-
iments confirm this result.19 Subjects who are asked to pronounce
phonemes involving muscle activity implicated in characteristic
emotional facial expressions tend, when they comply, to feel those
very feelings. The facial expression produced by pronouncing the
phoneme ‘e’, for example, resembles the smile. And it turns out that
pronouncing ‘e’ leads to a happier feeling. There is more to saying
“cheese” than we might have imagined.
Why all this should be so is fascinating question. Robert Zajonc
hypothesizes that there is an afferent feedback system in which
facial expression affects blood temperature in the brain, affecting
serotonin levels and changing affect. Whatever the mechanism, there
is impressive evidence that facial and other forms of motor mimicry
produce feedback and that mimicry can tend not only to modulate,
but also to initiate felt emotion.
Another example of an apparently dedicated form of mimicry is
the phenomenon of infant reactive crying. Studies have shown that
neonates have a significant tendency to cry in reaction to tapes of
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crying infants of like age.20 This kind of “primary circular reaction”
forms the first mode of Martin Hoffman’s developmental theory of
empathy. At this stage, empathic response in the child obviously
involves no sense of the other as the primary locus of distress.
Before awareness of others as distinct individuals, children experi-
ence “global empathic distress,” and are likely to seek comfort for
themselves when other children cry.21
The hypothesis that motor mimicry is a major empathic mecha-
nism was already present in Lipps’s and Titchener’s theories in the
early 1900’s. Experiments since have shown all manner of behav-
iors to evoke mimicry, including pain behavior, laughter, smiling,
affection, embarrassment, discomfort, disgust, ducking, stuttering,
word-finding, reaching, and success and failure at a timed task.22
Before passing to consider a more sophisticated variety of mimetic
empathy, namely, simulation of affective states, we should note some
fascinating studies that Janet Bavelas and her colleagues have done
on the communicative function of motor mimicry.
These experiments show that when subjects witness apparent
expressions of pain, their tendencies to mimic are substantially
affected by how likely eye contact is with the pain-expressing
person.23 It is as if the function of empathic mimicry were to mirror
the feelings of others. As these psychologists put it, “I show how you
feel.” Moreover, mimicry manifests “reflection symmetry.” When
two people are facing each other and one ducks to her right, the
person facing her is likely to duck to his left.24 We mimic, that is, not
by stepping into others’ shoes so much as by stepping into shoes that
will mirror to them their expressive behavior in their shoes. This
suggests a more interesting and satisfying mimetic basis for reci-
procity (and, thus, reciprocal altruism) than mere copying. When
A does something to B, reflection-symmetrical mimicry involves B
doing the same thing to A. Reflected mimicry supplies the target as
well the behavior copied.
Projective Empathy and Simulation
Emotional contagion is only a primitive form of empathy, involving
no projection into the other’s standpoint nor even, necessarily, any
awareness of the other as a distinct self. When we share another’s
feelings through contagion, it is not as from her point of view,
responding to her situation as we imagine she sees it.
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Early on, however, infants begin to develop the rudiments of
perspective taking that underlie more sophisticated forms of
empathy. The relevant phenomena are “social referencing” and “joint
visual attention.” Young children have been shown experimentally to
“reference” their mothers in potentially threatening circumstances,
to check her attitude, and to modify their behavior in light of it.25
As early as six months, babies in experiments whose mothers turn
and direct their gaze to an object in another part of the room exhibit
a tendency to turn also and fairly reliably discriminate the object
to which their mothers are attending.26 This is not the same thing
as projection into the mother’s perspective, but it certainly seems a
movement towards it.
The difference between emotional contagion and “projective”
empathy is something like the difference between Hume’s
“sympathy” and what Adam Smith calls “sympathy.” Humean
sympathy is felt as from an observer’s standpoint, beginning with
an idea of the other’s feeling inferred as the cause of witnessed
behavior. Smith argued, however, that the ability to form ideas of
others’ feelings already involves “sympathy.” “By the imagination
we place ourselves in [the other’s] situation,” and imagine “what
we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”27 Smith’s sympathy
differs from Hume’s in point of view and, consequently, in what it
is about the other we have in view. “When we see a stroke aimed
and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person,” Smith
writes, “we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own
arm” (TMS.9). We respond to the other person’s situation as from her
standpoint rather than to her reaction or to an imagined version of it.
And when the stroke falls, “we are hurt by it as well as the sufferer,”
if not in the same way (TMS.9). We feel an imagined surrogate of
what the other actually feels.
Several philosophers of mind, including Robert Gordon and Alvin
Goldman, have recently argued that empathy of this sort (simulation,
as they call it) is centrally involved in attributing mental states to oth-
ers (much as Smith had claimed).28 As against the familiar idea that
we attribute mental states via some common-sense theory, inferring
them as the best explanation of behavior, or by some induction over
cases, Gordon and Goldman hold that we frequently simply simulate
others. We place ourselves in their situation and work out what we
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would think, want, and do, if we were they. The idea is not that
our thought is explicitly self-conscious: “If I were she, I would feel
thus and so, so she probably feels thus and so.” Rather, we unself-
consciously project into the other’s standpoint, respond imagina-
tively from that perspective, and attribute the result to the other.
To illustrate some evidence for simulation, consider the following
story, with which subjects in a Kahneman and Tversky experiment
were presented:
Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees were scheduled to leave the airport on different flights,
at the same time. They traveled from town in the same limousine, were caught in
a traffic jam, and arrived at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled departure
time of their flights. Mr. Crane is told that his flight left on time. Mr. Tees is told
that his was delayed and just left five minutes ago.29
Which was more upset? If you are like 96% of Kahneman and
Tversky’s subjects, you will answer: Mr. Tees. How do we come to
this conclusion? It seems quite implausible that we survey general-
izations or make inductions about cases, and then attribute similar
states by analogy. Rather, we apparently simply imagine ourselves
in the respective positions and attribute our imagined feelings to Mr.
Crane and Mr. Tees. Better, we work out what to feel from these
perspectives, and attribute the results. Thus, as Mr. Crane: “Oh well,
I can’t complain. After all, that’s when it was scheduled to go off.”
As Mr. Tees: “Oooh, I hate it when that happens.”30
It is important that projective empathy is not simply copying
others’ feelings or thought processes as we imagine them. Rather,
we place ourselves in the other’s situation and work out what to feel,
as though we were they. This puts us into a position to second the
other’s feeling or dissent from it. As Smith puts it, we thereby express
our sense of the “propriety” of the other’s feeling, whether, that is, we
think it warranted or not. If we cannot “enter into” an angry person’s
sense of a situation that provokes her anger, we will feel her anger
inappropriate (TMS.11). Or if a person laments his misfortunes, but
“bringing [his]case home to ourselves” does not affect us similarly,
we will not share his grief but think it unwarranted (TMS.16).
There are two points worth emphasizing here. One, which I will
stress when we come to sympathy, is that feelings present them-
selves from the first-person standpoint as warranted by features of
the situation to which they apparently respond. Fear involves see-
ing something as frightening, and so, as warranting fear. Disgust
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is as of the disgusting. And so on. From the first-person perspec-
tive of a person having an emotion, one’s situation presents itself as
providing some warrant for the emotion. This doesn’t mean that one
must believe the emotion warranted, not even in any respect, and
certainly not all things considered. Rather, things will seem to one
as warranting the emotion (in something like the way the lines in
the Müller-Lyer illusion seem to be of different length even to those
who believe they are not). It will be to one as if one’s situation gave
one reason to feel as one does.
The second point is that if one is inclined to believe that another’s
feelings are not warranted by her situation, this will make it more
difficult to share them through projective empathy. Indeed, one’s
relative inability to empathize will itself be an expression of think-
ing the other’s feelings to be unwarranted (in Smith’s phrase,
“improper”). When we do share others’ feelings through projec-
tive empathy, consequently, we second their feelings and thereby
confirm them.
There are differences of degree here, of course. Sometimes we
implicitly assess what more or less anyone would reasonably feel in
the other’s circumstances, as we presumably do when we attribute
greater frustration to Mr. Tees. On other occasions, we assess
another’s feelings in relation to her personal characteristics. This is
the kind of projective empathy that is more appropriate to empathy
with another, as when we share another’s feeling as a way of caring
(sympathetically) for her. “When I console with you for the loss of
your only son,” Smith writes, “in order to enter into your grief I do
not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession,
should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son were unfortunately to
die: but I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not
only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and char-
acters” (TMS.317). Empathy of this sort is closer to sympathy, since
the grief I vicariously experience is “entirely upon your account, and
not in the least upon my own” (TMS.317). So long, however, as my
grief on your account is only as from your standpoint, and not from
my standpoint in appreciation of yours, we have empathy without
sympathy.
Even when we project into others’ characters, however, we must
still be able to share their feelings as apparently warranted from that
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perspective. If we cannot see features of their situation as providing
reasons for their emotions, we cannot share them. Here we are likelier
to regard the other as, in this respect at least, more aptly the object of
“objective” attitudes rather than the “participant reactive attitudes”
that Strawson famously claimed are essential to common life.31
Projective empathy is thus no less communicative than Bavelas
and her colleagues have found mimicry generally to be. When we
projectively mirror others’ feelings, we not only show them how they
feel, we also show them that we agree with them about how to feel.
We show we understand their feelings and signal our willingness to
participate with them in a common emotional life. This makes projec-
tive empathy central to the formation of normative communities –
like-minded groups who can agree on norms of feeling. (Think here
of post-seventies talk taking the form: “I was like : : : , and he was
like : : : , and I was like : : : , etc.” Or: “He goes [some act displayed
or described] and I go [some feeling displayed or described] : : : ” We
might see these attempts to elicit projective empathy in interlocutors
as ur-versions of fully articulate normative discussion about how to
feel.)32
Proto-Sympathetic Empathy
Projective empathy is a projection into the other’s standpoint. Atten-
tion is focused, not on the other, but on her situation as we imagine
she sees it, or as we think she should see it. This, again, is a funda-
mental difference with sympathy. In sympathy, it is the other and
the relevance of her situation for her that we focus on. There is,
however, a form of empathy that brings these into view.
Consider the difference between the instructions: (a) imagine
what someone would feel if he were to lose his only child, and
(b) imagine what it would be like for that person to feel that way.
Complying with (a) involves simulating someone in the imagined
circumstances in order to identify what feelings the situation would
apparently warrant when so viewed. It need involve no attention at
all to what it would be like for the person to have those feelings
or to suffer that loss. To comply with the second request, however,
one would have to simulate, not just a person with the relevant feel-
ings, but someone conscious of his feelings, their phenomenological
textures, and relevance for his life.
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Call empathy of this latter form, proto-sympathetic empathy –
“proto-sympathetic,” because it brings the other’s relation to his
situation into view in way that can engage sympathy on his behalf.
A person grieves the loss of his child, and in sharing his grief projec-
tively my focus is on the child who was lost, not the person whose
grief I share. When, however, I turn my attention to what it must be
like to live with this loss, I focus on the person himself and the ways
his grief pervades and affects his life. Before my thought was: What
a terrible thing – a precious child is lost. Now my thought is: What
a terrible thing for him – he has lost his precious child.
Proto-sympathetic empathy is informed by projective empathy,
but goes beyond it in not being felt entirely as from the other’s
standpoint (or, at least, not without projected self-consciousness).
Someone who has lost a child might be so consumed by the loss that
he is unable even to think about what living with it is like for him. So
someone simulating his experience would simulate being unable to
also. Or perhaps the loss is so devastating that he denies it, thinking
and acting as though the child were still alive. Only with the “double
vision” provided by some perspective on the person and his feelings
as well as by projective empathy with those very feelings can one
imagine what life must be like for him.
Projective empathy involves imaginative (or “off-line” versions
of the distress one imagines others to feel. Since Ezra Stotland’s
first experiments in 1969, however, studies have consistently shown
that subjects who projectively empathize report actual emotions and
show physical symptoms that parallel the likely reactions of their
targets.33 The imagined distress thus causes some level of real dis-
tress in the empathizers.
This distress can be felt as entirely personal. Martin Hoffman calls
this “empathic distress,” which he distinguishes from “sympathetic
distress.” Empathic distress has oneself as object and gives rise
to efforts to comfort or relieve oneself. Sympathetic distress, on
the other hand, has another’s distress as object and tends to cause
efforts on the other’s behalf.34 C. Daniel Batson and his colleagues
make a similar distinction between “personal distress” and what
they call genuine empathy, including within the latter “other-focused
: : : feelings of sympathy, compassion, [and] tenderness.”35
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As we are defining things, what Batson calls “empathy” is a
form of sympathy. But we can see how proto-sympathetic empathy,
at least, is significantly closer to Batson’s “empathy,” and thus to
what we are calling sympathy, than it is to personal distress. Like
genuine sympathy, proto-sympathetic empathy has the other person
and his plight as object. When we imagine what another person’s
grief is like for him, we are focused on the other person and his grief.
And this means that the distress we feel vicariously by projective
identification can find a new target, namely his distress, thereby
giving rise to sympathy. This new distress at his distress may be
supported, moreover, by association with similar experiences we
recall from our own lives. Recollecting one’s own grief at losing a
parent, say, may solidify one’s sense of the other’s loss and support
a concern for the other by association with sympathy for oneself.
The point is not that proto-sympathetic empathy necessarily gives
rise to sympathy. Someone in the grip of resentment, envy, or the
desire for revenge may take delight in the vivid appreciation of
another’s plight he gets from imagining what another’s situation
must be like for her. However, when sympathy is blocked in such
situations, it may be because empathic engagement is framed within
some larger concern or narrative in which the other and her situation
plays only a derivative role. If I see the other’s plight as deserved,
or as evidence of my own power, or as the plight of an enemy or
competitor, then I am less likely to sympathize. But then I am not
really attending undividedly to her or her plight. I am interested in
her point of view insofar as it enters into my own.
SYMPATHY
Over the past fifteen years, C. D. Batson and his colleagues have
been finding experimental support for what they call the “Empathy-
Altruism Hypothesis.”36 Because of the difference between Batson’s
definitions and ours, this research bears only indirectly on the rela-
tionship between empathy and sympathy as we are defining them.
But the indirect light is pretty bright nonetheless.
Batson’s experiments work by testing differences in the behavior
of subjects who are given an opportunity to help someone they
experience as being in need. The subjects are partitioned in two
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cross-cutting ways. One is a partitioning between “low empathy”
and “high empathy” subjects. For example, some subjects might be
told (as in Stotland’s experiments) to imagine how the person they
are observing feels (high empathy condition) with the rest being told
to attend carefully to the information they learn from observing the
person (low empathy). The other variable is “ease of escape,” how
easily subjects can avoid helping without retaining vicarious distress.
In a wide range of experimental conditions, designed to rule out a
wide variety of alternative hypotheses, high empathy subjects show
a remarkable disposition to help even when they can easily escape
doing so without vicarious personal distress.
Despite differences in definition, I take this as evidence of a
psychological connection between empathy and sympathy in our
terms. So far as I can see, all that is directly manipulated in Batson’s
experiments are forms of projective and proto-sympathetic empathy.
Thus, when subjects are told to imagine what another person is
feeling, they are being instructed to empathize, not to feel sympathy.
What Batson’s subjects directly exhibit is helping behavior rather
than sympathy. But Batson claims his experiments show that what
explains this helping is a motivational state whose “ultimate goal” is
“increasing the other’s welfare.”37 I conjecture that, in many cases
at least, this motivational state is sympathy.
Sympathy, again, is a feeling or emotion that responds to some
apparent threat or obstacle to an individual’s good and involves
concern for him, and thus for his well-being, for his sake. Introduc-
tory psychology students in one of Batson’s early experiments hear
an audio tape they believe to be of a fellow student, Carol, who has
had to miss a month of class while hospitalized as the result of an
auto accident. The subjects are asked if they will help Carol make up
missed work. Subjects in the “difficult escape” condition are told that
Carol will be back in their discussion section in a week, and those
in the “easy escape” condition, that she will be studying at home,
conveniently out of view. Subjects whose empathy is heightened by
imagining what Carol must be feeling show a remarkable tendency
to help, even in the easy escape condition (71%). Why?
Assume that Batson is right that his experiment shows that what
moves these students is an other-directed rather than self-directed
motive like the desire to remove vicarious personal distress. What
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is the nature of this other-directed motive? Of course, it might be
that the subjects had some standing desire or principle to aid others
in need and that empathy simply makes Carol’s need more evident
than it would otherwise have been. Another, and I think more likely,
possibility, is that the vicarious distress that high empathy subjects
feel comes to have a new object, namely, Carol and her predicament.
On this hypothesis, the subjects feel an emotion that is directed
toward Carol and her plight. Their empathy gives rise to sympathy.
Initially distressed as from Carol’s point of view, they came to be
distressed at Carol’s plight and on her behalf. They came to feel
concern for her and, consequently, to desire relief from her plight
for her sake.
Sympathy’s Object
Sympathy is an individual-regarding emotion. We feel sympathy for
someone, just as we can have fears or hopes for someone or on
someone’s behalf. All these emotions are forms of concern for a
person for his own sake. The “for its sake” construction is revealing
here. Something is desire, felt, or done for something’s “sake” when
the desire, feeling, or action is out of regard to (or for), that is, quite
literally, with a view towards, that thing. It is with attention to or in
consideration of the thing itself that we desire, feel, or act, when we
do so for its sake.
According to philosophical orthodoxy, the standard object of
desire, action, and feeling is some proposition or possible state of
affairs. If I want an ice cream, the real object of my desire is that
I eat an ice cream. Or if I fear a tiger, then perhaps I fear that I
might be eaten by a tiger. Moreover, it sometimes seems implicit in
ethical writing that what it is to care about another person is simply
or primarily to have a desire with a specific propositional content,
namely, that the person fare well.
Even if desires and feelings have propositional objects, however,
some also have “indirect objects” that are non-propositional.38 In
particular, the form of desire involved in sympathetic concern does.
Seeing the child on the verge of falling into the well, we don’t simply
desire that the disaster be averted. We desire this for the child’s sake,
that is, out of a sympathetic concern for him.
Notice the difference here between a desire that the child be safe
and a desire for this for the child’s sake. Virtually anything can strike
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our fancy. So we might imagine someone whimsically forming an
intrinsic desire that the child be safe. But a desire for this for the
child’s sake cannot be so formed, by its very nature. Any desire for
something for someone’s sake is a form of concern for that person
and so not a matter of whimsy. Here we have a difference in desire
that cannot be captured propositionally. Both desires have the same
propositional object, but only the latter is a desire for that object for
the child’s sake. Either desire motivates action for the goal or end of
the child’s safety, but only the latter moves us to seek this goal for
the child or on the child’s behalf.
Sympathy and Value
Sympathy involves concern for another in light of apparent threats
to her well-being or good. We desire her good, not just intrinsically
(for its sake), but also for her sake. Moreover, we do so in a way that
connects us, as I shall argue in conclusion, to values of two different
kinds – value for a person and person-neutral value.
On the one hand, sympathy presents itself as warranted by threats
to a person’s good. Welfare is normative for sympathy. If there is
no threat to the person’s well-being, then there is nothing to be
concerned about on her behalf. Sympathy is not called for.
On the other hand, sympathetic concern presents itself as of, not
just some harm or disvalue to another person, but also the neutral
disvalue of this personal harm owing to the value of the person
himself. In feeling sympathy for the child, we perceive the impending
disaster as not just terrible for him, but as neutrally bad in a way
that gives anyone a reason to prevent it. We experience the child’s
plight as mattering categorically because we experience the child
as mattering. The point is not that sympathy makes these claims
true, or even that it counts as evidence for them. Rather, sympathy’s
emotional presentation is as of the neutral disvalue of another’ woe,
and hence, as of a categorical justification for preventing it. To the
person sympathizing, it is as if there is a reason to relieve the other’s
suffering consisting simply in the fact that the person herself, and so
her good, matters.
It is useful here again to compare sympathy with a whimsical
(or an habitual) desire for someone’s welfare. The latter desires
might be intrinsic, the other’s good being desired for its own sake.
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However, in that case the desiring person will not see himself as
having a categorical reason for furthering the other’s welfare, one
that is unconditional on his desiring it. If I whimsically desire do to
something simply for its own sake, I won’t see myself as having a
reason to do so even in the hypothetical case in which I am not struck
by that desire. But this is precisely what is involved in sympathy. We
experience the threat to the child as a categorical reason for anyone
to act on its behalf, a reason that is unconditional on our now wanting
this. If others deny the reason, that will conflict with the way it seems
to us from our perspective in feeling sympathy.
Sympathetic concern thus involves an experience (less commit-
tally, an appearance) of people, and hence, their welfare as mattering
in a way that is not just person-relative. If we can credit these appear-
ances, we can conclude that our welfare matters, not just to us, but
categorically, because, as it seems to us when we are the objects of
our own sympathetic concern, we matter categorically.39
In addition to sympathy’s involving the appearance of another
person’s good as mattering categorically, I believe that the very idea
of a person’s good or welfare is tied to concern for that person for
his sake.40 I have already claimed that concern for another for her
sake cannot be reduced to a desire for that person’s good. Generally,
it is because we care about someone that we desire her good, not
vice versa. I have also claimed that there is a distinctive form of
this desire, namely the desire for someone’s good for her sake, that
is conceptually tied to concern. Desire for something for someone’s
sake just is a form of desire that springs from concern. In addition, I
believe, there is a deeper link between a person’s good and concern
for that person. What is good for a person is what it makes sense
to want for that person for her sake. Start, that is, with the idea of
caring about someone for her own sake, an idea with which we are
familiar from the phenomenon of sympathetic concern. Then, what
it is for something to be good for that person will be for there to be
reason to want it for her (on her behalf, that is, insofar as one cares
about her).
In other words, what makes a desire other- or self-regarding is not
that it is directed towards the relevant person’s good. Rather, a desire
is self- or other-regarding if it springs from and expresses self- or
other-regard, that is, a regard or concern for that person. And what
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makes something good for someone (self or other), is that it is the
object of a rational self- or other-regarding desire. What is primitive
is concern for the person. Something is good for that person by
virtue of being something it makes sense for anyone caring about
her (perhaps she herself) to want for her sake.
As against desire-satisfaction theories of well-being, then, not all
of a person’s desire, not even all her rational desire, are relevant
to her good. Rather, what is good for a person is what we or she
would rationally desire for her, that is, for her sake. A version of this
thought can be found, of all places, in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics,
usually regarded as the locus classicus of the informed-desire theory
of well-being.
Sidgwick is famous for the formulation that a person’s good “is
what [that person] should actually desire and seek if all the conse-
quences of seeking it could be foreknown and adequately realised
by [him] in imagination at the time of making [his] choice.”41 It
is little noted, however, that Sidgwick intends this only as a first
approximation and that he revises it in two important ways. First,
Sidgwick holds that any reductionist account of a person’s good, like
the informed-desire view, which supposes the idea to be “entirely
interpretable in terms of fact, actual or hypothetical,” leaves out its
normative aspect. Since, by Sidgwick’s lights, a person’s good is
normative for desire, this makes any such account unacceptable. A
more satisfactory, nonreductive rendition, he says, would be this:
what is “ultimate[ly] good on the whole for me,” is “what I should
practically desire if my desires were in harmony with reason, assum-
ing my own existence alone to be considered.”42 This includes,
in addition, to an explicit normative element (“in harmony with
reason”), a second restriction to what one would desire for one’s
own life. If I rationally desire something to be part of your life, and I
desire this even for the hypothetical situation in which I am not alive,
then the satisfaction of this desire makes to addition to my good.
It is easy to understand what motivates a restriction of this sort on
rational desire theories of a person’s good. In Derek Parfit’s example,
if, after an affecting conversation with a stranger whom you will
never hear of again, you form an abiding desire for her welfare,
the satisfaction of that desire years later and unbeknownst to you
does not add to your welfare.43 But a restriction to the boundaries
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of a person’s own existence won’t properly fix the scope of rational
desire for purposes of identifying his welfare or good. For one thing,
there may be things that are intrinsic to personal welfare, such as
flourishing personal relationships, that logically require the existence
of others. For another, it is arguably that there are things one may
rationally desire whose objects essentially include oneself, such as
that one keep a promise, that are not obviously intrinsically relevant
to a one’s good.
Sidgwick has, however, another way of stating this second restric-
tion that is more promising. Before he presents the first, informed-
desire version of his rational desire account of a person’s good, he
remarks that he will observe the following constraints: “we will
consider only what a man desires for itself – not as a means to an
ulterior result – and for himself – not benevolently for others.”44
Most likely, Sidgwick understands desiring something for oneself
to be equivalent to desiring it for one’s own existence. As we have
seen, though, these are not equivalent. A desire for something for
oneself that would however provide the appropriate contrast with
benevolence would be a desire for that thing for one’s own sake. It
would be, that is, a form of desire that springs from or expresses
self-regard – a concern for oneself.
If we interpret Sidgwick’s rational desire theory of a person’s
good with this understanding of desiring something for someone,
what we get is this: something is part of someone’s good if it is
something the person would rationally desire, in itself for herself,
that is, for her own sake as an expression of self-concern. But if it
makes sense for someone caring about herself to want something for
herself, then it must also make sense for anyone caring about her to
want that thing for her also. This yields that what it is for a thing to
be good for someone is for it to be something someone caring about
her has reason to want for her for her sake.
If some view along these lines is correct, then the concern we
experience for people in sympathy is central, not just to seeing
individuals and their well-being as having categorical importance,
but also to the very concept of well-being or personal good. A
person’s good has intrinsic normative force, not for desire in general,
not even for those of the person herself. Rather personal welfare is
normative for desires for that person’s sake, and thus for concern for
EMPATHY, SYMPATHY, CARE 279
that person. It is because we can take up the standpoint of one-caring
towards ourselves and others and ask what it makes sense to want
from that point of view that we have a need for the concept.45
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